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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'IW STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Respondent 
lfS, 
r"CORGE ALBERT ROYBAL, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19064 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant George Albert Roybal appeals from•the judgment and 
conviction of Aggravated Assault, a felony of Third Degree in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant George Albert Roybal was tried before a jury and 
convicted of Aggravated Assault on February 25, 1983. Appellant 
waived minimum time for sentencing and was sentenced by Judge 
Frederick February 25, 1983 to the indeterminate period of 
zero to five years, confinement to begin forthwith at the Utah 
State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered below 
or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours on December 28, 1982, Mr. 
Sebastian, a cab driver and the victim in this case picked up 
three customers at Eighth West 50 South. These customers 
him to go to the Bottoms Up Lounge, al so in Salt Lake City. They 
asked him to wait outside for a few minutes (T.16-18). After 
about fifteen minutes, the original customers and four more 
returned to the cab, the defendant among them (T .19) . The defenda' 
sat in the front seat next to the cab driver. Another passenger 
sat in the front seat by the door (T.21). The driver then stoppec 
Fifth North Fourth West to drop off a couple who had been sitting 
in the rear seat (T.23-24). 
The remaining passengers wanted to return to the lounge. At 
the intersection of 600 West, 300 North, Appellant Roybal pulled 
out a knife (T.28). Appellant did not lunge, swing, or attempt 
to stab with the knife (T.63). Mr. Sebastian claimed appellant 
held the knife six to ten inches from his body and asked if he 
wanted to die (T.31,32). The cab driver stopped the cab, jumped 
out, and ran up the street (T.33-34). He ran to a house with 
lights on from which he called the police (T.35). 
In recounting the events, Mr. Sebastian claimed the other 
passenger in the front had a knife as well (T.36). Mr. Sebastian 
was not cut as a result of the incident, but did get pricked 
on his hand. Mr. Sebastian described appellant's knife as a buc' 
knife with a blade about one inch wide and about five inches lone 
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IT lY,S9). He described the other knife as a stiletto type 
i:,,, I c; (']'. 6 0) • 
Neither knife could be found by the police to be presented 
AS evidence. Over defense counsel's objections, a substitute 
knife and a ruler were admitted instead, a point which appellant 
r1ow appeals (T.14,45). 
When appellant was booked into jail, the booking officer 
noted he was very intoxicated (T.153). He now argues this 
intoxication negated the intent to assault Mr. Sebastian. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRAIL BY THE 
INDIVIDUAL AND CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALLOW-
ING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
During the trial irrelevant and prejudicial evidence was 
admitted over defense counsel's objection. No knife 
was ever recovered following the assualt (T.13). The State 
proferred a substitute knife. Although the trial court initially 
announced the potential prejudicial effect of the knife out-
weighed the probative value, the court eventually allowed the 
substitute knife to be introduced (T.45). Additionally, a ruler 
"'as adrni tted to show the length of the knife blade (Id.). 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in effect at the time 
t '''' trial stated the court had discretion to exclude evidence 
ti,,_, "probative value [was] substantially outweighed by the 
'- ;k tha L its admission (would] . . . (b) create substantial danger 
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of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading 
the jury. 
There must be an abuse of discretion to reverse a trial 
court's admission of evidence. Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977). The principles of two Utah cases 
are applicable here, even though each involved the trial court's 
exclusion of evidence. 
In Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977) 
this court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude immateria: 
evidence on weather conditions at the airport which was twenty 
miles from the scene of the plaintiff's fall on an icy sidewalk. 
In so doing, this Court stated, "[t)he weather report. . had 
very little, if any, probative value and it could have created 
a substantial risk of confusing the issues." Id. at 1141. 
More recently, in Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), 
this Court affirmed the exclusion of possible negligence in Rh 
antibody testing in a medical malpractice case for harm arising 
from an amniocentesis test. The trial court had excluded the 
information because the Rh sensitivity did not cause the injury 
and any negligence by the doctors in diagnosis and treatment of 
the sensitivity was potentially prejudicial to the determination 
of medical negligence in causing the injuries suffered. Id. at 
96-97. 
In this case, each admission as well as their cumulative 
effect constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
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:•Jone of the evidence admitted here was relevant. It was presented 
\jy l11e State solely for its prejudicial impact. 
No material fact was advanced by the admission of a substitute 
'111fe. The jury may have believed the exhibit was the actual 
knife recovered or exactly like the knife recovered. This was 
merely an attempt to prejudice the jury with irrelevant evidence. 
There was little probative value to this substitute knife. 
The ruler which was admitted over defense counsel's objection 
only served to prejudice the jury. Mr. Sebastian could only 
describe the knife as one which was over four and under six 
inches long (T.59). Appellant was prejudiced by the effect of 
allowing the jury to measure five inches on a ruler. This served 
no probative value when the witness himself could not accurately 
describe the length of the blade. The jury was allowed to specu-
late needlessly regarding the length of the blade. 
Each inadmissible piece of evidence, as well as the cumulative 
impact, created reversible error in this case. This cumulative 
effect, if not the individual errors, warrants a new trial. In 
Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), the 
cuurt stated: 
When a review of the entire record reveals 
numerous irregularities that tend to pre-
judice the rights of a defendant and where 
an accumulation of errors denies a defendant 
a fair trial, the case will be reversed, even 
though one of the errors, standing alone, 
would not be ample to justify reversal. 
ln the court reversed where there was prosecutorial mis-
·endue t in cross-examination and closing argument. 
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The prejudicial effect of the errors in this case warrants 
reversal of appellant's conviction. Prejudicial evidence was 
erroneously admitted. Appellant is entitled to a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S INTOXICATION 
NEGATED THE REQUIRED INTENT FOR AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT. 
Mr. Roybal was so intoxicated when he was booked into the ja:. 
that the booking officer had made an entry on the booking sheet 
describing him as very intoxicated (T.153). In the officer's 
opinion, Mr. Roybal fit into the highest possible category of 
intoxication used in the booking process (T.153-54). 
Under Utah law, when intoxication negates the existence of 
the state of mind required for the commission of the crime, the 
act is "purged of its criminality." State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 
79 (Utah 1981) citing to §76-2-306, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). When intoxication renders the accused incapable of 
forming the required specific intent, voluntary intoxication is 
a defense to the crime. 627 P.2d at 79 citing Williams v. State, 
Ind., 402 N.E. 2d 954 (1980). 
On the facts of State v. Potter, this court described 
aggravated assault as a crime of general intent. However in that 
case, the defendant held a gun which he pointed at the floor. 
Potter remained polite and never threatened the victims, nor did 
he raise his weapon. Id. at 77. Potter did not intentionally 
use his weapon in the commission of a crime. In the case at bar, 
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aypcllant intentionally used a weapon and caused fear in his 
•ict1m as a direct result of ·using his weapon. Further, 
1: struction No. 11 required the jury to find appellant acted 
"ei tl1er intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" before they con-
victed him of aggravated assault. It seems clear the type of 
behavior in this case warrants distinction from the type of 
behavior in State v. Potter. It follows that the behavior in 
the case at bar is more closely akin to a specific intent crime 
than a general intent crime. 
Evidence indicates Appellant Roybal was incapable of forming 
the required specific intent and the jury ignored voluntary 
intoxication as a defense to the crime. Based on his inability 
to form the required intent, his conviction on aggravated assault 
cannot stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was denied a fair trial by the admission of a 
prejudicial substitute knife because the State never found the 
actual knife used in the assault. This prejudice was compounded 
by the additional admission of a ruler to show the length of the 
knife blade. Furthermore, the jury ignored the defense of 
1nluntary intoxication and convicted appellant of aggravated 
•3sault even though intoxication negated the existence of the 
IJ'1Tf.IJ this ;z_j_ day of October, 1984. 
Respectfully 
At orney 
,_/ 
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/ 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
City, Utah 84114, this day of October, 1984. 
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